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Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
This brief essay, a reply to a forthcoming essay by Radicals in Robes by
Saikrishna Prakash in the Columbia Law Review, makes two points. The first is that the
abstract idea of interpretation cannot support originalism or indeed any judgment about
the competing (reasonable) approaches to the Constitution. Any such judgment must be
defended on pragmatic grounds, which means that it must be attentive to consequences.
The second point is that the consequentialist judgments that support minimalism also
suggest that there are times and places in which minimalism is rightly abandoned. For
example, broad rulings may well be justified when predictability calls for it; and the
Supreme Court was right to refuse minimalism in the late 1930s. While minimalism is
generally the proper approach to “frontiers” issue in constitutional law, its own
pragmatic foundations suggest that constitutional law should not be insistently or
dogmatically minimalist.
I. Audiences
Such trouble over the title! The original proposal was called The War for the
Constitution – but the debate about constitutional interpretation just isn’t a war. At one
point, I favored Visions of the Constitution, but my publisher vetoed that idea – too
boring. The final draft was called Fundamentally Wrong. Vigorous, to be sure, but also
obscure, and offering, without charge, a snappy two-word ending for unkind reviewers.
At the last moment, my publisher proposed Radicals in Robes: Why Right-Wing Courts
Are Wrong for America. I accepted the proposal on the ground that with respect to titles,
publishers tend to know best. But I did insist that the word “extreme” be added before
“right-wing” – with the thought that while right-wing courts might not be so bad, extreme
right-wing courts are definitely wrong for America. On reflection, the addition probably
didn’t help. Oh well.
Radicals in Robes was written for a general audience, and its original motivation
was simple: To challenge the ludicrous but apparently widespread view that while
liberals want to “change” the Constitution, conservatives want to “follow” it. In the last
decade and more, some conservative judges have been reading the Constitution in a way
that lines up with their own political views: to invalidate affirmative action programs,
campaign finance laws, and restrictions on gun control; to strike down certain laws
protecting the environment and forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability and
age; to protect commercial advertising; to permit discrimination on the basis of sex and
sexual orientation; to allow government to provide financial and other assistance to
*
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religious institutions; to give the President broad, unilateral authority to fight to war on
terror; and to contain no right of reproductive choice or sexual liberty. Radicals in Robes
was partly designed to show that for all the talk of “strict construction,” and for all the
insistence on distinguishing between law and politics, we are in the midst of a period in
which some prominent conservatives1 are attempting to use judicial power for their own
political ends. Of course judges usually act in good faith. But it is nonetheless true that
references to history, and to the views of the framers and ratifiers, are sometimes a fraud
and a façade.
At the same time, Radicals in Robes tries to make two points that (the author
hoped) might have academic interest as well. The first is that throughout American
history, many of our debates about constitutional interpretation have involved conflicts
among four identifiable groups: originalists,2 perfectionists,3 minimalists, and
majoritarians.4 The second is that any approach to constitutional interpretation has to be
defended by reference to its consequences.5 The Constitution does not set out the
1

It is not entirely comfortable, in a law review article or in a book about constitutional law, to make
references to “conservatives” and “liberals,” or to use words like “right-wing” and “left-wing.” One reason
is that terms of this kind threaten to stop thought for conservatives and liberals alike. (People sometimes
ask, not what they think on particular questions, but what their group thinks about those questions – and in
particular what the opposing group thinks on such questions. The views of the groups, once identified, can
crowd out and close off their own thought.) Another reason is that the views of sensible people cannot
possibly line up consistently with the stereotypical judgments of either “conservatives” or “liberals” or “the
right” or “the left.” Why on earth should anyone follow the stereotypes with respect such diverse questions
as affirmative action, Roe v. Wade, same-sex marriage, the minimum wage, the Iraq War, capital
punishment, and climate change – to name a very small subset of salient questions in law and politics?
Nonetheless, Radicals in Robes does use politically charged language, and not only in its title. The
reason is that the Supreme Court, and methods of constitutional interpretation, have been politicized by
conservatives and liberals alike, and it is hard to write a book for a general audience without discussing
some of the underlying political views and dynamics. Prakash says that I am “not trying to convince the
right,” but in fact I meant to speak to people with widely varying political views; I do not believe that
reflective “conservatives” should endorse originalism, just as I do not believe that reflective “liberals”
should endorse perfectionism.
2
In Radicals in Robes, I use the term “fundamentalism” for “originalism,” on the ground that the
former term seems to me at once more accessible and illuminating for a general audience; originalists want
to go back to what they see as fundamentals, and in any case there is a clear link between the originalist
method and certain claims about how to interpret religious texts. I did not intend “fundamentalism” to be a
pejorative in any way. But some originalists, including Prakash, object to that term, and in deference to
their objection I am happy to speak of “originalism” instead.
3
For an illuminating recent defense (with a good title!), see Ronald Dworkin, Justice In Robes (2006).
4
For a valuable recent defense, see Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006).
5
This claim can also be found in Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005) and Vermeule, supra note; and
I believe that with some qualification, it is implicit in Dworkin, supra note. There are interesting
relationships between Dworkin’s conception of law as integrity – which I characterize as a form of
perfection – and minimalism. In my view, any conception of constitutional interpretation must, in the end,
be perfectionist, in the sense that it attempts to make best sense out of our practices. Originalists,
minimalists, and majoritarians can be understood as perfectionists too – but second-order ones, skeptical
about the idea that judges should deploy moral and political ideals of their own. Originalists, for example,
seek to deprive judges of the authority to deploy those ideals, often on the ground that judicial judgments
are unreliable and in any event a disservive to self-government. Majoritarians are similarly skeptical of the
view that judges have some special access to moral and political truth. See Vermeule, supra note. But a
serious problem, for both originalists and majoritarians, is that their approaches are inconsistent with so
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instructions for its own interpretation. A theory of interpretation has to be defended,
rather than asserted, and the defense must speak candidly in terms of the system of
constitutional law that it will yield. Consider the illuminating suggestion by Randy
Barnett, a committed originalist: “Given a sufficiently good constitutional text,
originalists maintain that better results will be reached overall if government officials—
including judges—must stick to the original meaning rather than empowering them to
trump that meaning with one that they prefer.”6 In my view, Barnett is entirely right to
suggest that if originalism is to be defended, it is on the ground that it will produce
“better results . . . overall.”
Of course consequences can be evaluated in different ways, and hence we should
expect diverse people to disagree about which consequences are good. If originalism
permits racial segregation, is it unacceptable for that reason? How strongly, if at all, does
it account against originalism if originalists must allow affirmative action programs, or
refuse to recognize a right of privacy? And in evaluating consequences, we must certainly
ask whether an approach to interpretation would unleash judges to do whatever they
wish. To say the least, self-government is important, and part of the appeal of
majoritarianism, originalism, and minimalism is that all three approaches attempt to cabin
the power and the discretion of the Supreme Court. Perfectionism has a serious problem
on this count; and hence minimalists have a serious problem with (for example) the
reasoning in Roe v. Wade.
I am grateful to Saikrishna Prakash for his illuminating, careful, and generous
review. Prakash makes two principal arguments. The first and more straightforward is
that originalism “is merely a means of making sense of text,” and hence originalists need
not provide, and do not provide, any argument on its behalf. The second and more
complex is that minimalism is not a theory of interpretation at all, but a kind of “passing
fancy” -- an approach that its own advocates will surely abandon when the time is right,
just “like a snake sheds its skin.” For this reason, minimalism turns out to be unstable,
even opportunistic. Let me begin with Prakash’s claims on behalf of originalism.
II. A Theory of Interpretation Must Be Defended, Not Asserted
Prakash insists that in deciding on the meaning of a text, we should not think
about consequences at all. He acknowledges that we might refuse to accept a text, after
we have uncovered its true meaning. But there is a large difference between picking
policies (for, say, environmental protection) and deciding on how to understand the
Constitution’s terms. Originalists believe “that to discern the meaning of words, we ask
what it would mean to those who penned or uttered those words.” Prakash offers what he
calls a “simple case” for the originalist approach, which is that “it tracks common
much of established law – and hence do not “fit” our practices. Minimalists, who also attempt to discipline
judicial power, can make better claims along the dimension of fit. The relationship between integrity and
consequentialism is this: In deciding what makes best sense out of the existing legal materials,
consequentialists insist that consequences matter. As noted in text, a normative account is of course needed
to evaluate consequences.
6
Available at http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp.
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conceptions.” Originalism is not a political choice, any more than it is a political choice
to be originalist when reading law reviews articles or People Magazine. When we ask
about the meaning of words uttered by friends and acquaintances, we are likely to be
originalists; we ask what they meant. Why isn’t the same true for constitutional law?
Prakash means to ask a rhetorical question. But (a rhetorical question) has he? Let
put to one side two problems that originalists must overcome: (a) the possibility that the
framers and ratifiers meant to offer a general principle whose meaning is not frozen over
time; and (b) the difficulties in construing the constitutional text in circumstances that the
framers and ratifiers could not possibly anticipate.7 Even if we disregard these two
problems, debates over constitutional interpretation cannot possibly be resolved by
stipulating what interpretation “is,” or by pointing to “common conceptions.” What is
needed is an argument, not a stipulation. And if “common conceptions” are to be
followed, it is because good reasons can be marshaled on their behalf. To marshal good
reasons, we will have to speak of consequences.
In fact judgments about interpretation are always consequentialist; pragmatic8
arguments, of one or another sort, cannot be avoided. Suppose that a friend says, “let’s
meet in the usual place for lunch today.” Of course I would ask about the specific,
intended meaning – not about the most popular (“usual”) place in the area, and not about
my own judgments about what place is, or ought to be, usual. But the reason for this kind
of everyday originalism is not adequately captured by a stipulation about what meaning
“is”; the reason lies in the point, or reason, or purpose, of this particular communication.
When my friend and I are deciding where to meet for lunch, it makes no sense for me to
do anything other than to attempt to discern his specific, intended meaning. (If I don’t do
that, we won’t meet!) In contexts in which we ask about specific, intended meanings, and
do that without much thinking, it is because consequentialist or pragmatic arguments so
require. But sometimes an inquiry into authorial intentions cannot be justified in this way.
Consider one of Prakash’s own examples: judicial interpretation of the precedents
of the Supreme Court. Prakash thinks that I “surely envision[] that originalism would be
used.” But I envision no such thing, and in fact the example cuts hard against his claim
about “common conceptions.” No one follows originalism in interpreting the Court’s own
precedents. No one thinks that the Court must ask, in interpreting (say) Roe v. Wade or
Brown v. Bd. Of Educ. or McCulloch v. Maryland: What was the specific, original
7

See Radicals in Robes, supra note, at XX-YY. Throughout this Reply, I assume that originalism is a
coherent enterprise that can overcome these objections.
8
I am understanding pragmatic arguments to be consequentialist ones, as in the standard pragmatic
view. See Williams James, What Pragmatism Means, in Pragmatisn 43, 45 (1907): “The pragmatic method
is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world
one or many? – fated or free? – material or spiritual? – here are notions either of which may or may not
hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases
is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it
practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?” I believe that Prakash’s
argument is pre-pragmatic, in the sense that it refuses to trace the “respective practical consequences” of
one or another view of interpretation, and acts as if hard questions can be solved at the level of concepts or
definitions. But an effort to establish this point would take me beyond the boundaries of this Reply.
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meaning intended by Justice Blackmun or Chief Justice Warren or Chief Justice Marshall,
or by those who signed the Court’s opinion? When the Court interprets its own
precedents, it is hardly originalist; it attempts to make best sense out of the prior
decisions, in a way that has nothing to do with specific authorial intentions.
Of course a theory of interpretation, to qualify as such, must attend to the text that
is being construed; otherwise it is not a theory of interpretation at all. But constitutional
interpretation is, or at least might be, very different from communication between friends
– in the sense that specific, intended meanings are, or might be, controlling in the latter
context but not in the former. The (inescapable) question is whether consequentialist
arguments justify our adoption of a theory of interpretation that requires adherence to the
original understanding of the founding document. That question must be answered with
an argument, not a stipulation. The idea of authorial intentions is attractive in many
contexts, but it is not compelled by the very idea of interpretation, and indeed many
prominent originalists recognize the point9 – and reject authorial intentions in favor of the
original public meaning.10
There is no a priori reason to reject originalism.11 We could easily imagine a
society in which originalism would have a strong consequentialist defense. In such a
society, the original understanding would lead to an excellent system of rights and
institutions; departures from the original understanding would untether judges, who
would compromise democratic self-government and produce an inferior system or rights
and institutions; and the original understanding, if followed, would permit the democratic
process to correct inadequate understandings of rights and institutions over time. In such
a society, what could possibly be wrong with originalism? Many originalists believe that
our own society is not unrecognizably different from this one.12 If they are right,
originalism might be justifiable on consequential grounds. But I do not think that they are
right. Originalism fails for that reason. The broader point is that originalism is
inescapably a political choice, and it has to be evaluated as such.
Prakash does not care about the consequences of originalism, so apparently it
does not matter to him, for purposes of selecting an approach to constitutional
interpretation, if originalism, properly understood, would permit race and sex
discrimination by the national government; eliminate the right to privacy; allow racial
segregation at the state level; permit states to establish their own religions; require
abolition of the administrative state; or for that matter doom most Americans to short and
miserable lives. Nonetheless, Prakash does think it relevant to say that I ascribe “unlikely
9

See Barnett, supra note.
See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997).
11
I am bracketing some historical and conceptual questions. See note supra.
12
See
Akhil
Amar,
Rethinking
Originalism,
Slate
(2005),
available
at
http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/ Of course Amar does not contend that the Constitution, as originally
understood, is perfect, but he attempts to rebut the consequentialist argument against originalism. If Amar
were correct on the consequences of originalism, the argument against originalism would be significantly
weakened. Interestingly, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997), and Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989) have strong consequentialist features; Scalia
does not contend that originalism is right because it is what interpretation is.
10
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possibilities” to originalism and that my account of its consequences is “silly.” His reason
is that the consequences that I trace “simply would not transpire if this country followed
the original Constitution.” For example, there “is no groundswell for racial segregation,”
and “there is no likelihood that the states will reestablish churches.”
Prakash is right to say that if originalism were followed, states are unlikely to
respond by segregating schools by race or by establishing their own churches. But
Prakash understates the contemporary importance of the constitutional doctrines that are
now in place. Without the current ban on racial discrimination, we would surely see much
more in the way of racial discrimination. Without the current application of the
Establishment Clause to the states, we would surely see, at some times and places, forms
of government favoritism toward religion, and forms of religious struggle in state
legislatures, that would make the United States a quite different nation from what it now
is. In any case my goal is to trace the potential consequences of originalism for
constitutional law, a point of independent interest; and on that point Prakash offers no
rejoinder at all.
III. What Minimalism Isn’t
Prakash has a great deal to say about minimalism. He objects that small steps can
go in many different directions, and that minimalism, in the abstract, does not identify the
proper directions. He contends that far from being a theory of interpretation, minimalism
is merely an account of how courts should decide cases, one that “tends to privilege the
views of the Warren and Burger courts” and thus defends “the doctrinal status quo.” Most
fundamentally, he objects that if consequentialism is really our guide, the appeal of
minimalism is sharply limited. As Prakash contends, “perhaps consequential[ist]
minimalists really ought to be perfectionist about legislative power, originalists about
executive power, and majoritarians when it comes to privacy rights.” He argues that if
originalists succeed n the next twenty years, and make radical changes in the law,
“minimalism has got to go” – hoist by its own consequentialist petard. A consequentialist
minimalist turns out to be fickle, because he would have to abandon his own method after
a long period of originalism or majoritarianism. In any case Prakash thinks that
minimalism is less humble than it appears to be. In the end it depends on a belief that “the
doctrinal status quo is rather good” – a freestanding judgment that seems evaluative and
so not terribly modest.
I think that Prakash is generally right here, and that the conscientious minimalist
ought to welcome most of these claims. Prakash is right to say that minimalism does not
specify the small steps that judges ought to take. It is possible to imagine liberal
minimalists and conservative minimalists; majoritarian minimalists and originalist
minimalists; “active liberty” minimalists13 and “negative liberty” minimalists. Prakash is
also right to press hard on the relationship between consequentialism and minimalism.
With good reason, he argues that consequentialism supplies the best defense of
minimalism – and that when consequentialism argues against minimalism, we ought not
to be minimalists.
13

This is a plausible characterization of Justice Breyer. See Breyer, supra note.
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It is important to disaggregate two aspects of minimalism here. First, minimalists
tend to like decisions that are narrow, in the sense that they do not want to cover issues
not before the Court. Minimalists also prefer decisions that are shallow, in the sense that
they avoid the largest theoretical controversies and can attract support from those with
diverse perspectives on the most contentious questions. But sensible minimalists offer no
theology or dogma. They freely admit that when predictability is important, narrowness
can be a big mistake.14 They agree that if the Court has enough experience to justify
acceptance of a deep theory, it is entitled to do exactly that. No sensible person could
embrace minimalism in all times and places, and hence Prakash’s objections to
minimalism, in some times and places, is entirely within the spirit of the most plausible
claims on its behalf, which are pragmatic and qualified.
This point should not be read for more than it is worth; Prakash reads the
argument for minimalism as more limited and less ambitious than it actually is. That
argument is hardly restricted to the particular circumstances of the early twentieth
century. Minimalism is grounded in an appreciation of the common law method and its
appropriate place in constitutional law. In the hardest and most controversial cases, the
Supreme Court should generally follow minimalism.15 For this reason, there is good
reason to doubt the analysis in Roe v. Wade, Reynolds v. Simms, and indeed a number of
the ambitious decisions of the Warren Court. Minimalists are skeptical of broad rulings
and theoretical ambition, whatever the political commitments that accompany them. On
consequentialist grounds, the frontiers cases in constitutional law – whatever their time
and place – are strong candidates for minimalism.
But let us sharpen Prakash’s challenge and suppose that in the next decades, the
least attractive and most highly politicized form of originalism prevails, so that the Court
moves the Constitution in directions that closely correspond to the views of the extreme
wing of the Republican Party. (Of course such a movement is exceedingly unlikely; it’s a
thought experiment, not a prediction.) After the movement is complete, should we want
new appointees to be minimalists – and merely to take small steps within the new
framework that the Court has devised? In my view, this question is close to that faced by
the Court in the late 1930s, when it had to choose among three possible courses for
dealing with the doctrine that it had developed in the last decades: to build on it, in
minimalist fashion; to chip away at it, also in minimalist fashion; or to repudiate it fairly
rapidly. The Court chose the third path. Was it wrong to do so? I do not think so,
especially because the decisions of the Lochner era erected a range of barriers -- with
dubious constitutional roots on any sensible interpretive theory -- to the decisions of
democratically elected officials, both state and federal.16
Of course any approach to interpretation, to qualify as such, must attempt to limit
judges; its application should not vary between Monday and Tuesday. But an approach
that makes sense in one nation may be senseless in another, and it is fine for courts to
14

See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Minimalism, 58 Stan L Rev 1899 (2006).
On the exceptions, see id; Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999).
16
For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, Mich L Rev (forthcoming).
15
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follow one approach in 1800 and quite another in 1954. If Prakash’s objection to the
contingency of minimalism seems convincing, consider the fact that no one complains
when courts rule narrowly because they lack enough information to rule ambitiously.17
Nor is it unusual to think that when a precedent is wrong, it should be limited rather than
extended – and that when it is egregiously wrong, it must be overruled.
It is true that minimalists must, on some occasions, be prepared to leave their
cocoons. But if an approach to constitutional law must be justified by reference to its
consequences, this is no problem for minimalism. Snakes shed their skins,18 but so, in
their way, do butterflies.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Cass Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@uchicago.edu
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18

See Breyer, Active Liberty, supra note (discussing privacy).
See Prakash, supra, at
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